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THE TEAPARTY THEORY OF CONSPIRACY
I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of variously expressed judicial misgivings,' there has been
an increasing use of the charge of criminal conspiracy, either in conjunction with substantive offenses or independent of them. 2 The popularity of this indictment among the public prosecutors has stemmed
from three basic sources: (1) the quantum of proof is frequently less
for the conspiracy charge, (2) a charge of a continuing conspiracy may
serve to extend the statute of limitations beyond that for the substantive
offense, and, (3) the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule permits the prosecution to introduce evidence which would be incompetent
in a trial for the substantive offense alone. Thus the duration of the
conspiracy is significant as it will determine the time from which the
statute of limitations will begin to run and the period in which the
hearsay statements of co-conspirators will be admissible.
II. OBSTRUCT THE DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
In general, a conspiracy is considered a complete offense at the
time of the unlawful agreement of two or more persons to act in concert, and is terminated either with the completion of the object of the
conspiracy or with the last overt act in furtherance of it, in those jurisdictions which require an overt act as an element of the offense.3 For
this reason the Federal courts in several cases made the distinction between a "continuing conspiracy" and a "conspiracy with continuing
objects."'4 This discussion will be limited to the development of criminal
conspiracy in the United States Federal Courts and will be particularly
focused upon those cases in which a conspiracy to obstruct the due administration of justice is charged.5 This particular charge has been in1 Other Recommendations of Senior Circuit judges, 1925 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep.
5-6; Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1959) (concurring opinion);
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
2 Arens, Conspiracy Revisited, 3 Buffalo L. Rev. 242 (1954).
3 Developments in the Law, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 960-61
(1959).
4 e.g. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
5 Title 18 U.S.C. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.
"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
Title 18 U.S.C. 1503. Influencing or injuring officer, juror or witness generally.
"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any .witness, in
any court of the United States or before any United States commissioner or
other committing magistrate, or any grand or petit juror, or officer in or any
court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination
or other proceeding before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any party or witness
in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such
court or examination before such officer, commissioner, or other committing
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creasingly utilized during the past few years to extend the statute of
limitations by charging a "conspiracy to conceal"; the concealment as
an attempt to defeat prosecution is alleged to obstruct the due administration of justice. One of the elements which has been considered
indispensable to an indictment for a conspiracy to obstruct the due
administration of justice is knowledge; e.g., knowledge that justice was
or will be administered. In Pettibone v. United States6 the defendants
were charged with encouraging mine workers to disobey an injunction
and the Supreme Court in reversing their conviction stated:
It seems clear that an indictment against a person for... endeavoring to influence or impede a witness or officer in a court
of the United States in the discharge of his duty, must charge
a knowledge or notice, on the part of the accused, that the witness or officer was such.., such obstruction can only arise when
justice is being administered. Unless that fact exists, the statutory offense cannot be committed . . .and without such knowl-

edge or notice, the evil intent is lacking.'
The majority of cases which have interpreted 18 U.S.C. 15038 have
involved a defendant or group of defendants who have attempted to
bribe or intimidate witnesses or officers of the court. Within this context several significant problems emerged. The first of these concerned
what Federal activities might be included within the "due administration of justice" concept and the necessity of alleging within the indictment the precise Federal activities which the conspirators agreed to
obstruct. In Etie v. United States9 the defendants were charged with
a conspiracy to obstruct the due administration of justice by inducing
certain witnesses by threats of violence to leave the jurisdiction of a
Texas District Court. The defendants urged that the indictment was
faulty on the grounds that it failed to allege which of several pending
cases were involved, and in affirming their conviction the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held: "It is unnecessary to limit
the conspiracy to any particular case, because it is conceivable that the
conspirators may have more than one case in mind. The indictment
may be as broad as the unlawful agreement." 10 Although the opinion
magistrate, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter
pending therein, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or
property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on
account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer,
commissioner, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on
account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats
of force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs,
impedes, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than five years. or both.
6 Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
Id., at 206-207.
s Statutes cited supra, note 5.
9 Etie v. United States, 55 F. 2d 114 (5 Cir. 1932).
10 Id., at 115.
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in the Etie case supra, suggested a possible extension of the Pettibone
criterion of knowledge, there was no doubt that there were cases pending in the District Court and hearings before its Grand Jury. The
government unsuccessfully attempted to extend the obstruction of justice charge to encompass a threat by a defendant to kill another if he
divulged incriminating information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the court in Scoratow v. United States held: "The act must be in
relation to a proceeding pending in the Federal Court. And a proceeding is not pending until a complaint has been filed with the United
States Commissioner."'

In United States v. Solow

12

the defendant was

charged with violating Section 1503 by destroying four letters in order
to prevent their production before a Grand Jury. The defendant, relying upon the Rosner13 case in which it was held that it was not obstruction of the administration of justice to encourage a witness not to
appear, when the witness was not under subpoena to appear, urged that
no subpoena duces tecum had been issued for the letters and hence
their destruction could not be obstructing the due administration of
justice. The court in denying this contention held:
The indictment alleges the defendant knew the grand jury was
conducting the aforesaid investigation . . . and had reason to
believe and did believe that he would be called as a witness before
the grand jury and that
the production of the correspondence
1
would be ordered by it.

4

The cou--t in distinguishing the Solow case from the Rosner case held
that in the latter, the witness could always be subpoenaed if the Grand
Jury needed his testimony, while in the Solow case, the destroyed documents could never be recovered.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York followed
the pattern it had set in the Solow case in the case of United States v.
Siegel15 the following year. In the Siegel case the defendant was
charged with a conspiracy to obstruct the due administration of justice
by influencing a prospective witness before a grand jury to destroy the
stenographic notes she had taken, to give false testimony before the
Grand Jury, if she was called to testify, and to substitute other records
in the place of those she had destroyed. The Grand Jury was investigating the testimony given by Matusow and his subsequent recantation
of that testimony. The indictment charged that the defendant knew
that the person he influenced was to be a witness before that particular
Grand Jury. The court held that although the witness had not yet been
called to testify, the defendant had knowledge that she would be called
137 F. Supp. 620, 621 (W. D. Pa. 1956).
12 138 F. Supp. 812 (S. D. N.Y. 1956).
13 United States v. Rosner, 10 F. 2d 675 (2 Cir. 1926).
14 United States v. Solow, supra, note 12, at 813-814.
15 152 F. Supp. 370 (S. D. N.Y. 1957).
11

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

and that such knowledge constituted sufficient notice. The court stated:
No doubt it is necessary to allege the defendant knew that there
was some inquiry in which these papers might be required or
that the grand jury had requested them, or perhaps both. However, such16 knowledge is amply and fully spelled out in this indictment.

A further clarification of obstructing the due administration of justice,
as this phrase appears in the final paragraph of Section 1503, was
developed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Haili v. United States.1 The facts of this case are as follows: One
Mrs. Bruce had been convicted of acquiring and obtaining marijuana
cigarettes. The sentence imposed was suspended and she was placed on
probation for a period of three years. One of the conditions of this
probation was that she was to associate only with persons approved by
the probation officer. The probation officer explicitly directed her to
keep away from the defendant, who himself had been convicted and
served a sentence for a narcotics offense. The defendant knew of the
terms of the probation, but nevertheless did see and associate with
Mrs. Bruce. In consequence of this the probation officer moved to
revoke Mrs. Bruce's probation and accordingly the suspension of sentence was set aside and she was committed for imprisonment. The
defendant was then charged with obstructing the due administration
of justice by knowingly assisting Mrs. Bruce in the violation of probation. In reversing the defendant's conviction for this offense, the Circuit
Court held:
Speaking generally, it might be said that many matters other
than proceedings pending in court have to do with the administration of justice. Thus, the gathering of evidence and procuring statements of witnesses by the Federal Bureau of Investigation is in a general way a functioning of the Federal government with respect to the administration of justice. Yet it has been
held that one who threatens to kill another if he gives any information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation cannot be
found guilty under Section 1503, Title 18. United States v. Scoratow, D.C.W.D. Pa., 137 F. Supp. 620, 621. There the court noted
that the phrase 'due administration of justice' in Section 1503
was 'qualified and limited by the enumeration of specific judicial
functions, concerned with the 'administration' of justice.' Also,
in a general way, it can be said that the supervision of a convicted prisoner in a penitentiary is a part of the administration
of justice, if that term is given a very wide meaning. We would
be surprised, however, if it were held that conduct designed to
encourage a prisoner to escape from a penitentiary could be punished under Section 1503.
The particularly defined instances of violation of that section
Id., at 376.
17260 F. 2d 744 (9 Cir. 1958).
16
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all relate to conduct designed to interfere with the process of arriving at an appropriate judgment in a pending case and which
would disturb the ordinary and proper functions of the court.
In Catrinov. United States, 9 Cir., 176 F. 2d 884, 887, this court
quoted with approval the statement that the statute 'is designed
to protect witnesses in Federal courts and also to prevent a
miscarriage of justice by corrupt methods.'
Interfering with witnesses, jurors, and parties operates to
bring about a miscarriage of justice in specific cases. Under the
rule of ejusdern generis, the general words which follow the
specific words in the enumeration of prohibited acts in the section here involved must be construed to embrace only acts similar in nature to those acts enumerated by the preceding specific
words. See Sutherland,Statutory Construction,3d ed., Sections
4908-4909. We are of the opinion that neither the language of
Section 1503 nor the history of its interpretation by the courts
support the conviction of this appellant.,'
Thus it appears that the Pettibone decision is still the law sixty-five
years later, and that in order that a defendant may be convicted for
obstructing the due administration of justice, it is necessary that he
have knowledge that such justice is being administered in a specific
case and his acts must be such as are to intimidate, coerce, or influence
witnesses or parties to these proceedings or destroy materials that he
knows will be demanded of him in these proceedings.
III. CONSPIRACY To CONCEAL

Because of the essentially vague nature of a charge of conspiracy,
the Federal courts have frequently repeated the necessity for care in
framing the indictment. The conspiracy statute is a criminal statute
and must be strictly construed. The indictment for the offense of conspiracy must contain all of the essential elements of the crime. Chief
Justice Fuller in the Pettibone case stated:
The general rule in reference to an indictment is that all of the
material facts and circumstances embraced in the definition of the
offense must be stated, and if any essential element of the crime
is omitted, such omission cannot be supplied by intendment or
implication. The charge must be made directly and not inferentially or by way of recital.
The conspiracy must be sufficiently charged, and cannot be
aided by averments of acts done by one or more of the conspirators in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.
This indictment does not in terms aver that it was the purpose
of the conspiracy to violate the injunction referred to, or to impede or obstruct the due administration of justice in the Circuit
Court; but it states, as a legal conclusion from the previous allegations, that the defendants conspired so to obstruct and impede.. ., but the indictment nowhere made the direct charge that
31

Id., at 745.
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the purpose of the conspiracy was to violate the injunction or to
interfere with the proceedings in the Circuit Court.1 9
This requirement of a direct and explicit allegation in the indictment
was reiterated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Asgill v. United States 0 in which the court held that merely
alleging the means intended to be used cannot be taken inferentially
to support a conspiracy indictment, unless the essential elements of
unlawful agreement and purpose have been fully and clearly stated.
The court further stated: "When the charge is laid, however, the terms
of the agreement must be set forth therein and until this is done evidence of the conduct of the parties cannot be held to be competent or
responsive to the then alleged agreement." ' 2 1 In Direct Sales Co. v.
United States the Supreme Court affirmed the position it had taken in
the Pettibone case fifty years prior and stated:
Without the knowledge, the intent cannot exist.... Furthermore,
to establish the intent, the evidence of knowledge must be clear,
not equivocal. .

.

. This, because charges of conspiracy are not

to be made out by piling inference on inference,22 thus fashioning.., a dragnet to draw in all substantive crimes.
In Ingram v. United States the Supreme Court again considered the
intent element in a conspiracy indictment and after quoting with approval its holding in the Direct Sales Co. case stated: "Conspiracy to
commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least
the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself.""2 s Perhaps the most eloquent plea for the limitation of prosecu-

tions for criminal conspiracy was written by Justice Jackson in his
concurring opinion in Kruleuitch v. United States24 in which he stated:
The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost
defies description. Despite certain elementary and essential elements, it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from
each25of the many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid.

Most other countries have devised what they consider more
discriminating principles upon which to prosecute
criminal gangs,
6
secret associations and subversive syndicates.2
However, even when appropriately invoked, the looseness and
pliability of the doctrine present inherent dangers which should
be in the background of judicial thought whenever it is sought
Pettibone v. United States, supra, note 6, at 202-203.
F. 2d 780 (4 Cir. 1932).
21d., at 785.
22319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943).
2360 U.S. 672 (1959).
24 Krulewitch v. United States, supra, note 1.
25 Id.. at 446-447.
26 Id., at 453.
'9

20 69
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to extend
the doctrine to meet the exigencies of a particular
27
case.

The importance of determining the duration of the conspiracy has
been briefly discussed in terms of its impact on the staute of limitations
and the admissibility of hearsay testimony. The distinction maintained
in United States v. Irvin28 between a "continuing offense" and "an

offense the objects of which are continuing" has at least until recently
been a convenient semantic distinction upon which prosecutors have
been able to secure indictments. A typical example of a continuing
conspiracy to conceal occurred in Rettich v. United States29 in which
the defendant was convicted of a conspiracy to assault and rob a mail
truck driver and conceal the stolen registered mail for the purpose of
keeping possession of the results of the robbery. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in affirming the conviction held
that the conspiracy was a continuing one and continued through the
acts of concealment.
In United States v. Perlstein3° the defendants were charged with
a conspiracy to influence, intimidate and impede witnesses in the District Court and before its Grand Jury in connection with its investigation of an illegal still which the defendants were operating in the Atlantic City Garbage Disposal Plant. The indictment alleged that the
defendants knew and expected that certain persons were about to be
called before the Grand Jury. The indictment further alleged as the
overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy seven telephone calls between the co-conspirators. The defendants contended that the indictment alleged that the conspiracy had been formed at a time long prior
to the Grand Jury investigation and that under the ruling in the Pettibone case knowledge of the proceedings was essential to the charge.
The court in sustaining the conviction held that the agreement was a
continuing conspiracy and that the last telephone call had been made
after the Grand Jury proceedings had commenced. Circuit Judge Jones
dissented on the grounds that the Pettibone strict requirement of knowledge controlled and that since a conspiracy is complete at the time of
the agreement, at which time no investigation was pending, the appellants were charged with committing an offense, which at the time
specified by the allegations of the indictment, was uncommittable. Judge
Jones commented in his opinion:
How thus can scienter be alleged or proven, when the thing
whereof one needs to have knowledge does not exist.
Certain it is that the conspiracy statute ... does not operate to
withdraw the necessity for averment and proof of any of the
27Id., at 449.
U.S. 450 (1878).
084 F. 2d 118 (1 Cir. 1936).
30 126 F. 2d 789 (3 Cir. 1942).
2898
2
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elements requisite to a charge of the substantive offense. What
may be a common law crime to obstruct justice in a State Court
is not germane to an interpretation of a Federal Statute, which
only prohibits such in a court, as there is no federal common
law. 31
Where there has been a direct concealment of a substantive offense, as in the Rettich case, supra, the courts have been faced with
the question as to whether this concealment is an element of the substantive crime or of the conspiracy to commit the substantive crime.
The Supreme Court in Fiswick v. United States32 held that such concealment was merely the continuing object of an already terminated
conspiracy. In the Fiswick case the defendants were charged with a
conspiracy to violate the Alien Registration Act of 1940 by concealing
and misrepresenting their membership in the Nazi party. They had
given false statements and encouraged others to give false statements
in reports required of enemy aliens. The court in holding that such
concealment did not constitute a continuing conspiracy stated:
Though the results of a conspiracy may be continuing, the conspiracy does not truly become a continuing one. U.S. v. Irvine.
There was no overt act of concealment which followed the act
of false statements. If the latter is permitted to do double duty,
then a continuing result becomes a continuing conspiracy. 33
The Krulewitch case, supra, concerned the indictment of the defendants
on a charge of violating the Mann Act and a conspiracy to violate the
Mann Act. The government contended that hearsay testimony of statements made after the alleged object of the conspiracy had been attained was admissible because the defendants at that time were concealing their prior illegal conduct and that from such concealment one
could imply a conspiracy to conceal. Such conspiracy to conceal being
in force at the time referred to by the questioned testimony, it could
be admitted under the hearsay exception. The court refused to accept
the theory of an implied conspiracy to conceal and on this question,
Justice Jackson concurred as follows:
I suppose no person planning a crime would accept as a collaborator one on whom he thought he could not rely for help if
he were caught, but I doubt that this fact warrants an inference of conspiracy for that purpose. Of course, if an understanding for continuous aid had been proven, it would be emand there would be no
braced in the conspiracy by evidence
34
need to imply such an agreement.

Moreover the assumption of an indefinitely continuing offense
would result in an indeterminate extension of the statute of
limitations. If the law implies an agreement to cooperate in de31 Id., at 800-801.

32329 U.S. 211 (1946).
:3 Id., at 216-217.
34 Krulewitch v. United States, supra, note 1 at 455-456.
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f eating prosecution, it must imply that it continues as long as
prosecution is a possibility, and prosecution is a possibility as
long as the conspiracy to defeat it is implied to continue.3 5
I do not see the slightest warrant for judicially introducing a
doctrine of implied crimes or constructive conspiracies.36
The case of Lutwak v. United States,37 concerned the indictment of
persons who were charged with a conspiracy to violate the War Brides
Act and to conceal the fraudulent nature of the marriages which were
entered into for the purpose of bringing into the United States alien
spouses. The Supreme Court followed the reasoning in the Krulewitch
case and in affirming the conviction held that the conspiracy to conceal
was an element of the offense charged. justice Jackson in his dissent
underscored the circuitousness of reasoning that is prevalent in conspiracy convictions. The question upon which his dissent is based is
whether the testimony of the spouses could be used to establish the
conspiracy, or whether it was blocked by the privilege of married persons not to testify against each other. Justic Jackson stated:
The trial court could only conclude that the marriage was a
sham from the very testimony whose admissibility is in question.
The court's position seems to be that privileged testimony may
be received to destroy its own privilege. We think this is not
allowable, for the same reason one cannot lift himself by his
own bootstraps.38
The problem of a conspiracy to conceal culminated in the case of
Grunewald v. United States,39 decided by the Supreme Court in 1957.
The petitioners had been indicted for a conspiracy to improperly influence employees of the Internal Revenue Service and with a conspiracy
to conceal these acts. Paragraph seven of the indictment alleged that
it was a part of the conspiracy that the defendants and co-conspirators
would make continuing efforts to avoid detection of the fraud perpetrated. Paragraph thirteen alleged that it was a further part of the
conspiracy that the defendants and co-conspirators at all times would
misrepresent, conceal and hide the acts done pursuant to and for the
purposes of said conspiracy. It is apparent that the indictment was
framed to avoid the pitfalls of the Krulewitch indictment. Here there
was no attempt to deduce a conspiracy to conceal from another conspiracy to violate a federal law. In reversing the conviction and returning the case for a retrial, the Supreme Court held:
Acts of covering up, even though done in the context of a mutually understood need for secrecy, cannot themselves constitute
35 Id., at 465.

361d., at 456.
37344 U.S. 604 (1953).
38 Id., at 662.
39 Grunewald v. United States, supra, note 1.
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proof that concealment of the crime after its commission was
part of the initial agreement among the conspirators.
In Krulewitch it was urged that a continuing agreement to
conceal should be implied out of the mere fact of conspiracy, and
that acts of concealment should be taken as overt acts in furtherance of that implied agreement to conceal. Today the government merely rearranges the argument. It stated that the very
same acts of concealment should be used as circumstantial evidence from which it can be inferred that there was from the
beginning an 'actual' agreement to conceal.
By no means does this mean that acts of concealment can
never have significance in furthering a criminal conspiracy. But a
vital distinction must be made between acts of concealment done
in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy,
and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have
been attained, for the purpose of covering up after the crime.
Prior cases in this court have repeatedly warned that we will
view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already
pervasive
40
and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecution.
The logic of the Krulewitch case and the Grunewald case was applied by the District Court for the Southern District of New York
again in the case of United States v. Peronne4 1 the following year.
The petitioners were convicted of a conspiracy to possess and transport
across state lines woolens which had been stolen from interstate shipments. The court in holding that there was a continuing conspiracy
through the concealment of the stolen goods stated:
In the case at bar the acts of the conspirators which took place
subsequent to the completion of the delivery on May 27 are not
merely attempts to conceal a crime already committed, as was
the case in Grunewald and Krulewitch. They were affirmative2
steps in pursuance and furtherance of the conspiracy charged.4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished the case of United States z'. Klein4 3 from the Krulewitch
and Grunewald rational. The petitioners were charged with a conspiracy to defraud the Treasury Department of income taxes by making
entries in the corporate books so as to conceal the true ownership and
compensation of the co-conspirators and with filing false income tax
returns to accomplish the same objectives. The indictment further alleged that the petitioners agreed that they would conceal and continue
to conceal the nature of their business activities and the source and
nature of their income. The court, apparently on the theory that the
concealment was an integral part of the offense to defraud, concluded
that this was not a subsidiary conspiracy, but was a continuing conspiracy and on this basis upheld the conviction.
40d., at 402-404.
4' 161 F. Supp. 252 (S. D. N.Y. 1958).
42 Id., at 259.
43 247 F.2d 908 (2 Cir. 1958).
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The Supreme Court in Forman v. United States4 4 again was faced
with a conspiracy to conceal. The petitioners operated a pinball machine
business and from the proceeds of this business held out income which
they failed to report on their federal income tax returns. The statute
of limitations had expired on the tax evasion offense and the petitioners
were indicted for a conspiracy to defraud the United States by fraudulently making false statements to the Treasury Department in order to
conceal their true income. The statements had been made after the
returns were filed and the statute of limitations did not bar a conviction
for conspiracy. The case was heard by the District Court prior to the
Supreme Court's opinion in the Grunewald case and at the request of
the defendants the charge to the jury was based on the request that a
conviction could not be obtained unless the jurors found a subsidiary
conspiracy. The government did not object to this request and it was
submitted to the jury in that form. Essentially the instructions were the
same as in the Grunewald case. The case was appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed 45 on the basis of the
Grunewald opinion which had been delivered after the conviction in
the District Court. The government on rehearing before the Court of
Appeals requested a new trial on the grounds that the indictment had
not charged the prohibited subsidiary conspiracy, but rather alleged
that the defendants had concealed their true income and misrepresented
same to the Treasury Department as an integral part of the original
conspiracy to evade taxes. The Court of Appeals granted the motion
for a retrial on the basis that the instructions were not submitted correctly and that the indictment and evidence permitted and required the
case be submitted to the jury on the theory that the overt acts of concealment were a part of a continuing conspiracy to conceal the evasion
of taxes, and thus not prohibited by the Grunewald opinion. The defendant on appeal to the Supreme Court raised the question of double
jeopardy, and in affirming the order for a retrial the court clarified its
Grunewald opinion and held that the Grunewald case, "was submitted
to the jury on the theory that 'the indictment alleges that the conspiracy
comprehended within it a conspiracy to conceal the true facts from
investigation,' "46 and distinguished this case on the grounds that the
indictment did not allege that one of the objects of the conspiracy was
to conceal the acts of the conspirators. The Grunewald case was again
cited as controlling in the case of United States v. Goodman.47 In the
Goodman case the Treasury Department requested records from the
defendant in order to provide them with information in a tax proceeding against a corporation in which the defendant had an interest. The
44 -U.S.-,

80 S. Ct. 481 (1960).

45 United States v. Forman, 259 F. 2d 128 (9 Cir. 1958).
46 Forman v. United States, supra, note 44, at 485.
47 178 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.Va. 1959).
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defendant refused to produce the records on the grounds that they
would incriminate him personally, and that though the statute of limitations had expired on evasion of his personal income, he had continued
to conceal from the Treasury Department his true income for those
years and hence was subject to an indictment for a conspiracy to conceal. The court in overruling his contention strictly followed the
Grunewald rationale and stated: "Silence of a conspirator to avoid detection, after the accomplishment of the object of the conspiracy so as
to keep it alive" is contrary to the opinion in Grunewald v. United
States.
Thus the law appears to be that of Krulewitch and Grunewald. A
conspiracy to conceal is not indictable if it is a subsidiary conspiracy.
A continuing conspiracy may be indictable, but it must be an integral
part of the substantive offense. An indictment for the crime of conspiracy to obstruct justice by concealment must meet the rigid criterion
of Pettibone as to knowledge and the subsequent criteria of Solow and
Siegel as to the necessity of a pending judicial case or inquiry. The
indictment must charge the agreement to conceal and allege the overt
acts of concealment in furtherance thereof. Yet it cannot indicate that
this conspiracy to conceal is subsidiary to another conspiracy for Krulezeitch and Grunewald have prohibited it.
4

UNITED STATES V. BONANNO 1

On November 14, 1957 a group of men gathered at the home of
Joseph Barbara, Sr. in upstate New York. When subsequently questioned by various local, state and federal law enforcement agencies,
administrative tribunals and Grand Juries, they gave various reasons
for being at Mr. Barbara's home that afternoon. On January 13, 1960
twenty of these men were convicted in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York for a conspiracy to obstruct
the due administration of justice by concealing through false and evasive statements their reasons for being at Mr. Barbara's home and what
transpired there.4 9 At this time their conviction is being appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This conviction and the indictment upon which it is based raise for the first time
in any Federal Court the proposition that a conspiracy to conceal is
in itself an indictable offense, without alleging that what was concealed
was in any way unlawful.
In an interview appearing in Life Magazine, Mr. Milton R. Wessel,
formerly Special Assistant to the Attorney General and the chief prosecutor in this case, faced the proposition squarely:
This agreement to lie, says the government, was conspiracy
and since no one has the right to prevent a lawfully constituted
177 F. Supp. 106 (S. D. N.Y. 1959) ; 178 F. Supp. 62 (S. D. N.Y. 1959) ; 180
F. Supp. 71 (S. D. N.Y. 1960).
49 Case No. 159-35.
48
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body from learning what it needs to know, this was a conspiracy
to obstruct justice, a felony punishable up to five years in prison
and $10,000.00 fine. Under this interpretation, said prosecutor
Milton Wessel last week, the meeting at Apalachin could have
been a teaparty. As long as they conspired to lie about its purpose,
they are guilty. We will prove they did.5"
Although ninety-two pretrial motions were submitted in this case
and Judge Irving R. Kaufman devoted three opinions to a discussion
of their merits, 51 and although the transcript of the trial consumes
more than seven thousand pages, the cornerstone of the conviction is
the indictment and the theory of criminal conspiracy which it proposes.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may reverse these convictions on a number of possible Constitutional and procedural bases before this comment appears in print. The ingenuity of the
theory upon which this indictment rests warrants its discussion in some
detail. The indictment is fully set forth in the appendix.
In order to understand the structure of this indictment, it is necessary to assume the perspective of the prosecutor who framed it. The
underlying, unstated major premise of this indictment is that the primary purpose of the meeting at Apalachin was illegal. No mention of
this primary purpose appears anywhere in the indictment. This omission was not accidental. As Mr. Wessel stated at the trial:
There has been a good deal of objection by the defendants to
the fact that this indictment does not refer in words to the nature
of the investigation conducted by the grand juries which the
indictment alleges were at least attempted to be obstructed. That
was a deliberate omission. Not that it would not have been a
but we deliberately
material or a relevant part of the indictment,
52
left it out and I think for obvious reasons.
One of these reasons may very well be that if the indictment alleged
as the purpose of the gathering at Apalachin the commission of a federal
offense, the conspiracy to conceal this offense would fall squarely within
the Grunewald case as a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal. Mr. Wessel
made this point again in his opening statement to the jury when he
stated: "I must tell you frankly at the outset that the government will
not establish what was going on at the meeting on November 14."' 3
The failure of the indictment to allege an illegal purpose of the Apalachin meeting was the basis of pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment. The motion to dismiss filed on behalf of defendant John A.
De Marco stated:
How can this amount to an obstruction of justice under Section 1503 when there was no question asked of any of these peo50 June 1, 1957, at 21.
51 Supra, note 47.

United States v. Bufalino and others, Appellants Consolidated Appendix, at
360a.
53 Id., at 453a.
52
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ple except questions about this meeting? What justice was obstructed? No one claimed in the indictment that it was a meeting
for criminal purposes. No one said that this was an unlawful
meeting. The Grand Jury that issued subpoenaes for these people did so only after the meeting and not for any other purpose
except to inquire of and about the meeting. This is alleged in the
indictment. Then what Federal law violations were these Grand
Juries who issued subpoenaes for these defendants and their
alleged co-conspirators following this meeting inquiring into
when all they inquired of these people was about this meeting
and the details of it? How can that possibly amount to an obstruction of justice when no one claimed in the indictment that
it was a crime to hold this meeting?
It is our contention that an indictment which charges that the
defendants met so that they could conspire not to reveal what
took place at a meeting, and which indictment does not relate
that anything unlawful did take place at such meeting and that
the purpose of the meeting was to violate Federal laws or plan
to violate Federal laws, fails to charge the commission of any
crime.
Such conduct on the part of the authorities sounds and appears oppressive. It does not appear to be proper law enforcement
when the law enforcement agencies or officers indict and attempt to convict persons for attending a meeting5 4that they,
themselves, do not claim was for criminal purposes.
This issue is squarely raised on the appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the brief filed for appellants
Castellano and Lombardozzi as follows:
The case is unique and presents alarming departures from accepted traditions of law enforcement ....

The government has

succeeded in convicting a large number of persons, who, with
others, had been present at a gathering, of conspiracy to hide
the objective of the gathering from law enforcement agencies,
without any proof of what that objective was, or even that its
purpose was nefarious.
We suggest, moreover, that the government finds itself on the
horns of a dilemma. If the purpose of the Apalachin gathering
was innocent, then there is no conceivable basis for imputing to
those who had been there an understanding that they would lie
about that purpose if questioned. On the other hand, if, as the
government argues, the gathering had a nefarious purpose-and
this was never established-then it must have been implicit that
the participants would hide that purpose, but that does not
amount to conspiracy. (Cites Krulewitch)
For all that appears from this indictment the purpose of the
gathering at Apalachin had no relation whatever to any matter
4 Attorney

Henry C. Lavine, Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Defendant John A.
DeMarco, at 5, 6, 9.
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of federal interest. How, therefore, could it be an obstruction
of federal justice to keep that purpose hidden. 55

The dilemma posed by an indictment based on this theory of criminal
conspiracy was recognized by the prosecution at the outset. By specifically charging a continuous agreement to violate Section 1503 in
paragraph 1 of the indictment, 5" they hoped to avoid the prohibition
of "piling inference upon inference." The government contends that
this pleading constitutes a sufficient charge of the conspiracy and it need
not be "aided by averments of acts done in furtherance of the object
of the conspiracy." The defendants contend that such allegations plead
only legal conclusions and that such legal conclusions, with a missing
major premise, make the indictment fatally defective. The government,
recognizing that one of the major hurdles will be the opinion in the
Grunewald case, states their position as follows:
Relying on Grunewald v. United States defendants move to
dismiss on the grounds that Court I charges only a conspiracy to
conceal, which they argue is not unlawful.
To the contrary, however, Court I charges a conspiracy to
commit perjury, to obstruct justice and to defraud the United
States, in violation of specific Federal Statutes. It charges a
conspiracy to conceal, but by committing specific Federal Crimes,
wholly unlike the concealment in the Grunewald case.
The Supreme Court held that such incidental acts of concealment (necessarily characteristic of intelligent criminal conduct
after the successful completion of any crime) could not be used
to avoid operation of the statute of limitations. At the same time
the Court also specifically held that the indictment would be
sound if such concealment were (as here) a primary object of
the conspiracy, and remanded the case for a new trial on that
theory .... here the concealment, in addition to being by unlawful
means as stated above, is the sole object of the conspiracy
charged. There is no other crime charged to which it is incidental .... 57
This "dilemma" was at least temporarily resolved in the government's
favor in Judge Kaufman's order refusing to dismiss the indictment
in which he stated:
The defendants, relying on Grunewald v. United States...
and the line of cases preceding it, argue that an indictment that
charges a conspiracy to conceal a crime is insufficient and must
be dismissed ....
The indictment in this case, however, does not
charge a conspiracy to conceal another crime, but alleges rather
a conspiracy to violate three specific Federal statutes. Those
statutes make defrauding the United States, obstructing justice
55Attorney Osmond K. Fraenkel, Brief for Appellants Castellano and Lombardozzi, at 6, 7, 29.
56 See Appendix.
57 S. Hazard Gillespie, Jr., United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Pretrial Motions,
at 6, 7.
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and committing perjury criminal, and merely involve activity
that might be considered a species of concealment. One who
agrees to lie agrees to 'conceal' the truth; obstruction of justice
may take the form of 'concealing' from an authorized tribunal
information germane to its functions. But, it cannot be contended, that perjury and obstruction of justice, or conspiracy
to commit either, are no longer crimes after the Grunewald
case.... The main objective of the conspiracy in this case was
'concealment' the commission of fraud, perjury and obstruction
of justice ....
The distinction between conspiracies of the kind
charged in Grunewald and the instant one is not merely formal. 51
Interwoven with the argument of the defendants that the indictment is faulty because by failing to state the major premise on which
it is based, viz., that the purpose of the gathering was illegal, the indictment pleads legal conclusions, rather than stating facts upon which
a crime may be charged, is the proposition that by failing to state such
a purpose, the jurisdiction of the Grand Juries is not established. Their
contention is that, even if Judge Kaufman's opinion is a correct statement of the law in Grunewald, the crime of obstructing the due administration of justice requires that justice be duly administered. Their
contention is that if the activities of the Grand Juries were outside of
their power or scope, justice was not being duly administered by them.
If an investigation into the purposes of the Apalachin gathering was
beyond the scope of the Grand Jury, or in the alternative if the basis
for such investigation is not alleged in the indictment, no conduct before
such Grand Juries can constitute obstruction, and likewise no statements can be considered perjury, as the statements are not material to
the investigations of an authorized judicial body. From the point of
view of the prosecution, this objection was anticipated when the indictment was framed. And although it never directly averred that the
Grand Jury founded its jurisdiction on the suspicion that a crime was
involved in the Apalachin gathering, it implied that such was the fact.
Paragraph 2 of the first count of the indictment, as it was returned by
the Grand Jury, was as follows:
That, further, as the said defendants and their co-conspirators
well knew, a special investigation had been commenced by a
United States Grand Jury in March of 1956 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(into racketeering and criminal syndicates with particular emphasis in the ladies' garment and ladies' garment-trucking industry, labor management field, and the narcotics traffic), and
has continued before Federal Grand Juries up until the date of
the filing of this indictment.
This wording provided the knowledge of an existing federal investigation at the time of the conspiracy, as well as implying the major premise
58 United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112 (S. D. N.Y. 1959).
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of the indictment, that the meeting at Apalachin was concerned with
the stated criminal activities. It also founded the basis for the questioning of the defendants by the Grand Juries on the assumption that
it was part of a continuing investigation into these criminal activities.
On a pretrial motion to strike portions of the indictment Judge Kaufman struck from this paragraph the bracketed descriptive phrase of the
Grand Juries' investigation as prejudicial surplusage. The defendants
contend that, by removing this phrase, the conviction has been secured
on an indictment that was never returned by a Grand Jury and perhaps
even more important the indictment, as it is modified, alleges no basis
for the Grand Juries' jurisdiction.
The problem of the jurisdiction and scope of Grand Juries is not
a settled one and "Although abuses of the power of a grand jury are
conceivable, such as prying into the details of domestic or business life,
the full extent of the inquisatorial power has never been settled by the
precedents." 59 Ir Federal matters "the inquisatorial powers of the
grand jury are limited by the jurisdiction of the court of which it is an
appendage." 0 This attack on the indictment as failing to allege the
jurisdiction of the Grand Juries was made in pretrial motions and was
reiterated in the appeal brief of appellants Castellano and Lombardozzi,
as follows:
It is, we submit, inconceivable that persons in the United
States should be called to account because it is claimed they
agreed to hide from a federal investigation agency something
with which the agency had no concern at all.... Here the indictment contains not one word to justify the impaneling of any
federal grand jury to investigate what went on in Apalachin.61
At the trial in a colloquy with Judge Kaufman, counsel for defendant
Joseph Profaci reiterated the basic proposition; the indictment was
faulty, it did not allege a crime; the Grand Jury mentioned in the
original indictment had been dismissed forty days before the gathering
at the Barbara house. Counsel stated:
That is why I said to you before-you know- one argument
depends on the other-that this so-called background information was deliberately inserted in the indictment. Matters long
prior to the alleged Barbara house incident are put in there to
confuse and obscure the fact that they failed to charge that the
specific grand jury where justice was supposed to have been
obstructed was investigating any crime at all . . . and don't let
anybody say that background material prior to the conspiracy
is going to be used to support a62 fatal weakness in the absence
of a direct and simple allegation.
-5 Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 396; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)
60 Id., at 438.
61 Supra, note 55, at 28.
62 Supra, note 52, at 287a, by Attorney Henry G. Singer.
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This "fatal weakness" of the indictment was denied by the government in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Pretrial Motions; the government, however, argued the sufficiency of the original
indictment before paragraph 2 of Count I was modified by Judge
Kaufman. The government's argument proceeded as follows:
In answer to the defendant's question 'What duty does a man
owe to a Grand Jury, or any other body, to answer questions
about a lawful meeting?' . . ., it is unlawful to agree to lie or

obstruct a Grand Jury, even if it ultimately turns out that the
conduct under inquiry was lawful. The powers of a Grand Jury
are not limited to inquiries into conduct which is actually
criminal.
This broad power of a Grand Jury is also response to defendants' argument that Count I does not sufficiently set forth facts
showing that the Grand Jury's investigation at Apalachin was
lawful. There is a presumption that the Grand Jury's conduct
was proper.
Defendants also argue that the indictment charges that the
Grand Juries were impaneled for the purpose of inquiring into
Apalachin, and imply that the object was to investigate something
lawful in order to find perjury or a conspiracy to conceal. The
suggestion is that Federal authorities were trying to manufacture
a crime where none existed.
There is no factual foundation for this unwarranted attack.
and it finds no support in the indictment. The indictment does not
say that Grand Juries were impaneled to look into Apalachin,
but that juries 'duly impaneled' conducted such inquiry. What
else they were doing and when they were impaneled is not
stated; if any inference of purpose must be read into the indictment, it would be that the inquiries into Apalachin (paragraph
4) were a part of the continuing special rackets investigation
begun in March 1956 (paragraph 2), about which the defendants
had knowledge and in which some of the Apalachin attendants
were involved (paragraph 3).
The indictment thus charges specific knowledge of the special
rackets investigation at the commencement of the conspiracy
on November 14, 1957 and specific knowledge of the Federal
inquiry into Apalachin thereafter. Accordingly, at all times during the conspiracy defendants are charged with knowledge of a
present Federal Grand Jury interest in their conduct. This is
clearly sufficient and distinguishes this case from Pettibone v.
United States, relied on by defendants.6X
In its rejection of the defendants' contention that the jurisdiction
of the Grand Jury had been exceeded and that no jurisdictional allegation appeared on the fact of the indictment, the government relied
heavily on the majority opinion written by Justice Jackson in United
States v. Morton Salt Co.64 In that case the Federal Trade Commission
6 Supra, note 57, at 8, 9, 10, 13.

64338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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ordered the petitioner to prepare and produce additional highly complex reports showing that they had complied with a cease and desist
order issued four years prior by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The order enjoined the petitioner from practicing certain production, marketing and pricing policies. The petitioner objected to the
power exercised by the Commission and contended that its investigative
function was circumscribed by actual violations. In rejecting this contention, Justice Jackson held:
It (the Commission) is more analogous to the Grand Jury,
which does not depend upon a case or controversy for power to
get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that a
crime is 65being violated, or even because it wants assurance that
it is not.

Even if one were to regard the request for information in this
case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy
themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law
and the public interest.66
The government attempted to bolster their conviction that a Grand
Jury has a wide latitude to investigate what it pleases with the cases
of United States v. Costello, 67 Blair v. United States,;" and Carroll v.
United States;69 in none of these cases was the jurisdiction of the
Grand Jury the issue; in all of them it was clearly apparent that they
were exercising legitimate power. In the Costello case the petitioner
appealed from a conviction for evading federal income taxes on the
grounds that the Grand Jury submitted an indictment which was based
on solely hearsay testimony. The Supreme Court in dismissing this
appeal held: "An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like any information drawn by the prosecutor, if
valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the
merits.

' 70

In the Carroll case the petitioner had been called before a

Grand jury investigating his possible violations of the Volstead Act. In
his testimony before the Grand Jury he denied that at a certain theater
party he had given, a young lady had been immersed in a bathtub of an
alcoholic beverage. Faced with other testimony that at least the act had
taken place, even though the beverage could not be proven, the Grand
jury indicted the defendant for perjury. He unsuccessfully contended
on appeal that the bathtub incident was not material to the investigation and hence a charge of perjury would not lie. The Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction held that the case of Blair v. United
States controlled and stated:
65 Id., at 642-643.
66 Id., at 652.
67350 U.S. 359 (1956).
68 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
6916 F. 2d 951 (2 Cir. 1927).
70 Supra,note 67, at 363.
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. (The Grand Jury is) not limited narrowly by questions of

propriety or forecasts of the probable results of the investigation.
The test of materiality in a grand jury investigation is whether
the false testimony has a natural effect or tendency to influence,
impede
or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing its investiga71
tion.

The Blair case, cited by the government for the proposition that a
Grand Jury has wide latitude and cited with approval by Judge Kaufman in his order denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, involved
a witness before a Federal Grand Jury in Michigan who questioned
the jurisdiction of the Grand Jury. The witness claimed that a Federal
Grand Jury was not empowered to investigate alleged corrupt practices
in the primary election of a United States Senator. The witness had
been explicitly and directly informed by the foreman of the Grand
Jury, that the investigation was not directed toward an indictment of
the witness. The Supreme Court held that one who is a witness before
Grand Jury proceedings, who has been informed that they are not
investigating him, does not have an interest in the proceedings which
will give him a standing to question the jurisdiction of the court or
Grand Jury over the subject matter that is under inquiry. Judge Kaufman's opinion relied on the Blair case as the ruling from it was reiterated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
States v. Cleary.72 The Cleary case involved a witness at a Grand Jury
which was investigating mail thefts. The witness complained that he
had testified before the Grand Jury without being informed that he
had the constitutional right to refuse to answer their inquiries. The
court in affirming his conviction held: "Accordingly the question here
is not so much whether Cleary, knowing his Constitutional rights, consciously elected not to assert them, but whether the testimony was
freely given all things considered.

' 73

The basic argument returns to and devolves upon whether the investigation of a presumably lawful gathering is subsumed under the
dicta in the Morton Salt Co. case. That case involved the Federal Trade
Commission and the Commission had knowledge of prior violations;
it was a corporation and not an individual. The extension of the holding
in this case to the proposition that a Grand Jury may investigate lawful meetings of individuals may not be warranted. Judge Kaufman
ruled on the propriety of the investigation by the Grand Jury as follows:
The defendants argue that they cannot be charged with conspiring to obstruct justice by interfering with the grand jury
investigations into the gathering at Apalachin, because it is not
alleged that anything unlawful took place at that gathering and
71 Supra, note 69, at 953.
72265 F. 2d 459 (2 Cir. 1959).
7 Id., at 462.
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grand juries have no power to investigate gatherings which they
characterize as proper. .

.

. The grand jury is an important in-

vestigative body with broad powers and functions. (cites the
Cleary case)
Undoubtedly a point may be reached where the grand jury
inquiry is so divorced from any possibility of uncovering or
charging a crime that its investigation may be considered
void. But I need not undertake gratuitously to discuss when
that point is reached, since it was certainly not reached in
this case. It is alleged in the indictment that at the time of
the gathering at Apalachin, into which the indicting grand
jury was inquiring, several of the defendants were under investigation in the district for other alleged offenses. If only
two of these defendants had previously been before a grand
jury and subsequently met together and with others, it would
be within the province of a grand jury engaged in the due
administration of justice to inquire into the purpose, motive,
and other surrounding circumstances of that meeting. The
point is that this grand jury was not embarking on a fanciful journey. From the face of the indictment it would appear
that it had a legitimate and reasonable interest in ascertaining, among other things, whether some of these individuals
who had appeared before other grand juries might be laying
a foundation for their conduct in future investigations, should
any ensue. It is not for those subpoenaed before grand juries
to set up their own standards of what is or is not the legitimate business of the grand jury. If such a principle were
adopted every man would become a law unto himself and the
work of grand juries would come to a halt.74
Judge Kaufman in his charge to the jury made clear the fact that
the major premise of the indictment need not be considered and
that the question of the jurisdiction of the Grand Jury was not a
matter for the jury to weigh. The charge occupied over one hundred pages of transcript; the following are excerpted therefrom:
It is the government's position that if you find that the statements given were false or evasive, and if you also find that
when compared they disclose a pattern of essential similarity, the logical inference you can draw is that these false or
evasive similar stories were given pursuant to an agreement.
According to the government whatever the real purpose
may have been for the alleged conspirators to visit Apalachin, it was a purpose which those attending desired to conceal.
Evasive testimony, however, need not be false, although it
may contain some material of that nature. You may find
testimony to be evasive if you find it Calculated to obstruct
or impede the due administration of justice, as might be the
case with testimony designed to conceal the existence and
true details of an alleged meeting.
7 Supra, note 58, at 115.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

I charge you that in your deliberations you are not to concern yourselves with whether these various bodies and persons had any right or authority to question any of the
alleged co-conspirators concerning their activities at Apalachin.

5

SUMMARY

The conviction of the twenty co-conspirators in United States

v. Bonanno places before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit the Constitutionality of the government's theory
of conspiracy to conceal as an independent crime; independent of
any allegation as to what was being concealed and whether what
was concealed was unlawful. If the appeal is not decided on the
Constitutionality of this issue, the government will use this technique again and some other court will be faced with this decision.
Justice Jackson in United States v. Di Re76 stated that "Presumptions of guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere meetings."
The case of United States v. Bonanno places this statement in issue.
JAMES M. SHELLOW

APPENDIX
The grand jury charges:
1. That commencing on or about the 14th day of November 1957, and contiu.
ously thereafter up until the date of filing this indictment, at the Southern
District of New York, Joseph Bonanno, Russell A. Bufalino, Ignatius Cannone, Paul C. Castellano, Joseph F. Civello, Frank Cucchiara, John A. DeMarco, Frank A. DeSimone, Natale Evola, Salvatore Falcone, Joseph Ida,
James V. LaDuca, Louis A. Larasso, Carmine Lombardozzi, Antonio Magaddino, Joseph Magliocco, Frank T. Majuri, Michele Miranda, John C. Montana, John Ormento, James Osticco, Joseph Profaci, Anthony P. Riela, John
T. Scalish, Angelo J. Sciandra, Simone Scozzari, Pasquale Turrigiano, defendants herein and Dominic J. Alaimo, Joseph Barbara, Jr., Joseph Barbara,
Sr., Giovanni Bonventre, Roy Carlisi, Gerardo V. Catena, Charles Chiri,
James Colletti, Dominick D'Agostino, Joseph Falcone, Carlo Gambino, Michael
J. Genovese, Vito Genovese, Anthony F. Guarnieri, Bartolo Guccia, Sam
Lagattuta, Russell V. Mancuso, Sam Mannarino, Patsy Monachino, Sam
Monachino, Dominick Oliveto, Vincent Rao, Armand T. Rava, Joseph Riccobono, Joseph Rosato, Patsy Sciortino, Salvatore Tornabe, Santo Trafficante, Jr., Frank J. Valenti, Stanley P. Valenti, Emanuel Zicari and Frank
Zito, co-conspirators not defendants herein, did unlawfully, wilfully, and
knowingly combine, conspire, confederate and agree together, and with each
other and with others to the said grand jury unknown, to commit offenses
against the United States, to wit: to violate Title 18, Sections 1503 and 1621,

United States Code.

2. That, further, as the said defendants and their co-conspirators well knew, a
special investigation had been commenced by a United States Grand Jury
in March of 1956 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and has continued before Federal Grand Juries up until
the date of the filing of this indictment.
3. During the course of said conspiracy as the said defendants and their coconspirators well knew, a meeting of individuals, some of whom were involved in the aforesaid investigation, was held at the home of Joseph Barbara, Sr., a co-conspirator herein, in Apalachin, New York, on or about
November 14, 1957, which was attended by the defendants and their coconspirators, among others.

75 Supra, note 52. at 1952a, 1951a, 1943a, 1964a.
76 332 U.S. 581, 593 (1948).
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4. During the course of said conspiracy, as the said defendants and their coconspirators well knew, following the aforesaid meeting, Grand Juries of the
United States, duly impaneled and sworn in and for the United States District Courts for the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, began
conducting an investigation into all of the material circumstances concerning
the aforesaid meeting, and issued subpoenas directing the said defendants
and their co-conspirators to appear before the said Grand Juries and give
testimony and evidence.
5. During the course of said conspiracy, it was the belief of the defendants and
their co-conspirators, that the individuals who had been present at the aforesaid meeting would be questioned in connection with said investigation concerning the aforesaid meeting, with respect to its purpose, the number and
identity of persons who were present, the arrangements preceding the aforesaid meeting, the conversations and other events which took place and all
the other circumstances surrounding the said occasion.
6. It was a part of the said conspiracy that the defendants and their co-conspirators, by false, fictitious, and evasive testimony, and by the commission
of perjury, would conceal from the aforesaid Grand Juries and from other
investigating bodies and agencies of the United States the fact that the
aforesaid meeting had taken place, the purpose and advance planning of the
aforesaid meeting, the number and identity of the persons who were present
on said occasion, the conversations and other events which took place, and
all the other material circumstances surrounding the said occasion.
7. It was a further part of said conspiracy that said defendants and their coconspirators, having taken oaths before competent tribunals, to wit, said Grand
Juries, in matters in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be
administered, that they would testify truly, would wilfully and knowingly
and contrary to said oath, state material matter which they did not believe to
be true.
8. It was a further part of said conspiracy that said defendants and their coconspirators would corruptly influence, obstruct and impede, and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in
the United States District Courts for the Southern District of New York and
elsewhere, by giving false, fictitious and evasive testimony and by the commission of perjury.
9. It was a further part of said conspiracy that the defendants would give and
would corruptly influence the said co-conspirators and others to give false
material information about the said meeting to investigating bodies and
agencies of the United States, and give false, fictitious, fraudulent, vague, evasive and manufactured material testimony under oath about the aforesaid
meeting before the said Grand Juries.
OVERT ACTS
1. In furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof,
on or about the 14th day of November 1957, in the Northern District of New
York, Joseph Bonnano, a defendant herein, made a statement to members of
the New York State Police.
2.-29. Substantially the same; alleging similar statements by some of the defendants before local, state and federal investigating agencies and grand juries.

